R 211340Z AUG 80
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4413
INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
USINT SEC HAVANA
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KINGSTON 6175

E.O.12065: GDS 8/15/86 (LAWRENCE LOREN E) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINS, JM
SUBJECT: TH CHOICES IN THE JAMAICAN ELECTIONS AND PROBABLY EFFECT OF THE ELECTION ON THE PARTIES

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: JOURNIALISTS, COMMENTATORS POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS AND CONCERNED OBSERVERS ALL AGREE THAT THE COM ING ELECTIONS WILL BE SIGNIFICANT FOR JAMAICA IN WAYS THAT NO ELECTION SO FAR HAS BEEN. CHOICES THIS TIME ARE DIFFERNT IN A MORE PROFOUND WAY AS ARE THE EFFECTS THE RESULTS WILL HAVE ON THE TWO MAIN PARTIES ON EHT FUTURE STRUCTURE OF JAMAICA AND ON ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS END SUMMARY.

3. UNTIL 1972 OR PERHAPS EVEN 1976. JAMAICA ELECTIONS OFFERED A CHOICE BETWEEN PERSONALITIES WHO NEITHER PROPOSED NOR SOUGHT TO COMPETE ON THE GROUNDS OF RADICALLY DIFFERENT POLICIES. WITH THE ADVENT OF MICAHEL MANLEY'S GOVERNMENT IN 1972 AND MORE EXPECIALLY AFTER THE JUNIOR MANLEY 'S TEAM RETURNED TO POWER IN 1976 THE QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGY RELATONS BE TWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENT AND EXTERNAL

ENTITIES TOOK ON AN OVERRIDING INTEREST. PERSONNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES DEGENERATED FROM TOUGH BUT ESSENTIALLY CONTROLLED COM PETITION UNDER RULES MUTUALLY ACCEPTED TO DEEP SEATED ANTAGONISMS. HENCE THE CHOICE FOR VOTERS IS NOW MORE CLEAR UT AND MORE MANINGFUL THAN PROBABLY AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST.

4. OF COURSE, THERE ARE STILL GREAT DIFFERENCE IN THE PESONALITIED AND CHARACTERS OF THE TWO PARTY LEADERS AND THOS DIFFERENCES WILL PLAY A CONSIDERABLE IF NOT CRITICAL ROLE IN INFLUENCING THE CHOICES OF THE VOTERS. THESE DIFFERENCES CAN BE PUT DOWN SUCCINCTLY AS:

5. BYOND THE CHOICE OF PERSONALITY THE MAINCHOICES WILL BE BETWEEN DIFFERING IDOLOGIES AND BETWEEN THE RECORD FO MANLEY AND THE PROMISE OF LACK THEREOF OF SEAGA AND COMPANY. IDOLOGICALLY, MANLEY OFFERS A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD BE CONCENTED PRIMARILY WITH IMPROVING THE LOSS OF THE POOREST THROUGH EXPANDED GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE. STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING THE PUBLIC SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY AND PLACING JAMAICA FIRMLY IN HE THIRD WORLD NON ALIGNED GROUPING. IT WOULD ALSO HAVE AN OVERLAPPING INTERESTS ON SOEM ISSUES WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION ABROAD AND THE COMMUNIST WORKERS PARTY OF JAMAICA AT HOME. THE US AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS, WOULD CONTINUE TO BE TREATED WITH GRUDGING RESPECT OUT OF ECONOMIC NECESSITY BUT JAMICA'S IDENTIFY WOULD BE SOUGHT NOTE IN OPPOSITION THAN IN COOPERATION WITH THESE NATIONS. SEAGA WHILE NOT AN IDEOLOGUE IS CON VINCED INTELLECTUALLY THAT A MIXED ECONOMY WITH A DOMINATN BUT CONTROLLED MARKET SYSTEM IS MOST COMPATIVLE WITH JAMAICA'S ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUT- TIONS AND THAT JAMAICA'S NATURAL FRIENDS ARE THOSE COUNTRIES WITH SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS. HE HAS IDENTIFIED UNEMPLOYMENT AND LACK OF OPPORTUNITY AS JAMAICA NUMBER ONE PROBLEM. HE PROPOSES TO DEAL WITH IT BUILDING A STRONGER PRIVATE SECTOR WHICH HE BELIEVES COULD PROVIDE THE JOBS AND FINANCE THE SOCIAL SERVICES NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE POOREST. BOTH MANLEY AND SEAGA SAY THEY WANT FOREIGN INVESTMENT. THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT MANLEY IS NOT WILLING TO MAKE PERMANENT ADJUST MENT IN HIS ATTACS ON THE SOURCES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT NOR TO GIVE IT THE PRIORITY SEAGA FEELS IS NECESSARY IN THE OVERALL POLICY MIX. BOTH CAN BE EXPECTED TO FAVOR INVESTMENT THAT WILL INCREASE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS AND TO DRIVE A HARD BARGAIN WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS. IN FOREIGN POLICY SEAGA IS OFFERING CORRECT RELATIONS WITH THE US AND EEC COUNTRIES RELAIONS ALL BASED ON HIS PERCEPTIONS OF JAMAICA'S NATIONAL INTEREST.

6. MANLEY'S RECORD HAS ITS OWN PROMISE OR LACK THEREOF DEPENDING ON WHAT THE INDIVIDUAL VOTER IS LOOKING FOR. MANLEY HAS TRIED OPENLY TO DEAL WITH JAMAICA'S PERENNAIL PROBLMS OF REACE CLASS POVERTY AND TO IDENTIFY HIS POLICIES IN A WAY THAT THE MAJORITY COULD FREELY FAVOR THEM. GLADLY OR GRUDGINGLY THIS PART OF MANLEY'S SOCAIL REVOLUTION IS WIDELY ACCEPTED AND PROBABLY RESPRESENTS A PERMANENT CHANGE IN HIS PARTY'S PHILOSPHY. THAT PART OF HIS RECORD WHICH IS CONTROVERSIAL AND MAKES FOR A CHOICE IS WHAT HE HAS DONE TO THE ECONOMY IN THE PROCESS, THE CLOSENESS OF HIS PARTY TO THE WPJ. HIS TOLERANCE AND FACORITIS TOWARD THE FAR LEFTIST IN THE PARTY. HIS PRE- DILECTION FOR IDENTIFYING HIS PARTY AND JAMAICA WITH CUBA AND ALLING THE SOVIET UNION THE VANGUARD OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY FORCES HIS DISTANCING HIMSELF AND JAMAICA FROM THE US AND TO A LESSER EXTEN THE EEC COUNRIES AND HIS TOLERANCE FOR LETTING JAMAICA BE USED AS A FORUM TO ATTACK THE US PROJECTING THIS BEHAVIOUR INTO THE FUTURE, PARTICULARLY IN THE JAMAICAN CONTEXT.

(b)(1) ED

EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDS/MR
REVIEWED BY RS DATE 25 JUN 1982
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 KINGSTON 6175

MAKES THE CHOICE BETWEEN MANLEY AND SEAGA EASIER FOR SOME. THERE ARE THOSE--BOTH SUPPORTERS AND DETRACTORS--WHO FEEL THAT MANLEY'S RECORD OF VOCAL SUPPORT FOR JAMAICA'S DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, WHEN CONTRASTED WITH HIS CHOICE OF POLITICAL FRIENDS AT HOME AND ABROAD, GIVES GROUNDS FOR REASONABLE DOUBT ABOUT HIS ULTIMATE INTENTIONS TOWARDS THOSE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. THE ZEALOUSNESS AND SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS WITH WHICH HE AND MANY OF HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE PNP JOIN THE WPJ IN DEFENCE OF THEIR FREEDOM TO EXPRESS THEIR IDEOLOGY INTENSIFIES SUCH CONCERN. DESPITE THE PNP'S BEST EFFORTS, SEAGA SEEMS LARGELY TO HAVE OVERCOME CONCERNS ON THE PART OF MANY THAT HE MIGHT LEAD THE COUNTRY INTO A MORE RIGHTIST AUTHORITARIONISM: AT LEAST SOME DUBIOUS SUPPORTERS HAVE SUPPRESSED THEIR CONCERN THAT HE MAY NOT DO SO.

7. YET ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW ON CHOICES IS EIMPLOYMENT OR ECONOMIC BENEFIT. THOSE IN GOVERNMENT OR DOING BUSINESS WITH THE GOVERNMENT WHO WILL LOSE THEIR JOBS OR CONTRACTS IF THE PNP LOSES THE ELECTION OR HOPE TO RECEIVE JOBS OR CONTRACTS IF THE JLP WINS, SEE THE CHOICE AS BETWEEN EARNING A LIVELIHOOD AND DISASTER. THEY ARE AMONG THE MOST DIE HARD, INFLEXIBLE ENTHUSIASTS IN BOTH PARTIES AND REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE ESTIMATED 35 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION GIVING ITS UNWAVERING ALLEGIANCE TO EACH OF THE MAIN PARTIES. THE PNP LIKES TO SPREAD THE IDEA THAT ALL OF THE POOR AND THE BLACK PEOPLE OF JAMAICA SUPPORT THEIR IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC SOCLSIM AS THE ONLY IDEOLOGY CONCERNED FOR THEM, THE COICE BEING BETWEEN A CARING PNP AND AN INDIFFERENT JLP. FOR ITS PART, THE JLP CLAIMS THE CHOICE IS BETWEEN A PNP WHICH MAKES GREAT PROMISES BUT LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF THAN BEFORE AND A JLP WHICH WILL TRY TO PROVIDE INCOME AND DIGNITY BY INCREASING JOB OPPORTUNITIES. IF BOTH THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET, THEN, THE JLP MIGHT WELL BE ALLOWED ENOUGH TIME IN OFFICE TO TRY OUT IS PRESCRIPTION FOR NATIONAL RECOVERY. A SMALL WIN COULD ALLOW EITHER PARTY, BUT ESPECIALLY THE PNP AND THE WPJ TO CRY FOUL, CAST DOUBT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVE[illegible]NT AND PERHAPS TRY TO BRING IT DOWN BY CONFRONTATION, PA[illegible]LY INCLUDING CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND PERHAPS EVEN LOW SC[illegible]NCY.

8. THE EFFECT OF THE RESULTS ON THE POLITICAL PARTI[illegible]-SELVES IS ALSO CRUCIAL. (ONE PLACE WHERE THE EFFECT ON THE PARTIES WILL BE MINIMAL IS IN THE PARLIAMENT WHERE PARTY DISCIPLINE IS ALMOST UNWAVERING EXCEPT FOR UNTIED VOTES ON MATTERS DECLARED QUESTIONS OF CONSCIENCE.) IF THE RESULT IS A JLP VICTORY, AS THE MOST INDEPENDENT POLLSTER IS STILL PREDICTING, THE EFFECT ON THE TWO PARTIES WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE JLP:

--RECEIVES A CONVINCING MAJORITY, SAY, OF AT LEAST 18, OR A 35 TO 25 SPLIT;
--CAN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY GIVE THE COUNTRY A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST BY FINDING THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO BEGIN TO REVIVE THE ECONOMY

A JLP LOSS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BRING ABOUT RADICAL CHANGES IN PARTY LEADERSHIP, NO MATTER IS THE LOSS WAS THE RESULT OF A RELATIVELY HONEST ELECTION OR COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO PNP/WPJ ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.

9. WIN OR LOSE, THE PNP SEEMS DESTINED TO BE IN FOR DECISIVE POST-ELECTION CHANGES. THE FAR LEFT, PARTICULARLY D.K. DUNCAN, HUGH SMALL AND THEIR ALLIES, TONY SPAULDING AND DUDLEY THOMPSON, CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONSILIDATE THEIR HOLD OVER THE PARTY. THE EXCUSE CAN BE EXPECTUED TO BE AN INDICTMENT OF MODERATE INFLUENCES IN THE CASE OF DEFEAT AND, IN THE CASE OF VICTORY, INTERPRETING THE RESULT AS A VOTER ENDORSEMENT FOR MORE LEFTIST POLICIES. HOW MUCH FARTHER LEFT AND AT WHAT PACE IS HARD EVEN TO ESTIMATE AT THIS STAGE. AGAIN, WIN OR LOSE, MANLEY'S DAYS AS PARTY LEADER COULD BE NUMBERED. HE COULD CONTINUE TO BE USEFUL IN EITHER EVENT BUT HIS PREEMINENT ROLE IN THE PARTY WAS DEFINITELY TAKEN FROM HIN IN THENEC VOTE ON THE IMF LAST MARCH. HE COULD CONTINUE AS OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER OR PM AS LONG AS THE FAR LEFT WANTS HIM THERE BUT THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE THEIRS, NOT HIS. HIS PENCHANT FOR SURVIVAL COULD IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES BE SEEN AS A LACK OF COMMITMENT, A WEAKNESS THAT THE FAR LEFT MIGHT NO LONGER ACCEPT.

10. WHAT MUCH OF JAMAICA SEES AT STAKE IN THIS ELECTION IS NOTHING LESS THAN THE FUTURE POLITICAL IDENTITY AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THEIR COUNTRY. SOME FEAR A PNP VICTORY COULD MEAN THAT PNP LEFTISTS WORKING WITH THE WPJ WOULD USE THE MANTLE OF ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY TO INSTALL THEMSELVES IN POWER INDEFINITELY BY CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION TO ESTABLISH A REPUBLIC AND ONE-PARTY STATE. A JLP VICTORY IS NO ASSURANCE OF STABILITY EITHER AS THE DOCTRINAIRE IDEOLOGUES OF THE LEFT CAN NOT BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT IT GRACEFULLY AND THE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL UNITY AND THE ECONOMY WILL REQIRE THE SKILL OF A GENIUS AND THE COOPERATION OF EXTERNAL DONORS, WHO WILL BE HARD TO FIND.
LAWRENCE